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MAGWELL,LLC; FIRST NOLIA ENTERPRISES,INC.;







This matter comesbefore the court on (i) the motion to confirm an arbitration award filed
by Claimant Susan Wells-Wilson pursuantto the Georgia Arbitration Code (“GAC”), O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-1 et seq. and(ii) the motion to vacate the arbitration awardfiled by Respondent D. Richard
Wells (“Wells”) and the joinder in said motion filed by Respondents Magwell, LLC (“Magwell”)
and First Nolia Enterprises, Inc. (“First Nolia”) (Wells, Magwell, and First Nolia shall be
collectively referred to as “Respondents”). The court held a hearing on this matter on July 1,
2020. Havingconsidered the entire record and oral argumentofthe parties, the court finds as
follows:
Wells-Wilson, Wells, and RespondentLinda J. Palmerare siblings(collectively, the
“Siblings”). Their parents, Donald and Ruby Wells, now deceased, formed Magnolia Advanced
Materials, Inc. (“Magnolia”) which manufactures epoxies. Previously, Magnolia’s shareholders
included Nolia Enterprises, L.L.L.P. (“Nolia”), which held 60.45% of Magnolia’s outstanding
stock, and Donald and Ruby Wells, who ownedthe remaining 39.55% of the shares. Donald and
Ruby Wells were each 45% partners of Nolia and the remaining 10% was ownedbythe general
partner, First Nolia. First Nolia was in turn owned by Donald and Ruby Wells, each holding
50% of the stock.
Throughgifts and inheritance from their parents, the Siblings becameshareholders of
Magnolia, with each Sibling receiving 13.18% of Magnolia’s stock. Nolia continuedto hold
60% of Magnolia’s stock. In addition, the Siblings came to own Magnolia stock indirectly
through Nolia, as each Sibling became a 33% partner ofNolia. The general partner, First Nolia,
held the remaining 1% interest.
In 2002, Wells purchased 100% ofthe stock of First Nolia and becameits president.
Because hethen controlled Nolia’s general partner, First Nolia, Wells was able to control the
mannerin which the Magnolia stock held by Nolia was voted(the “Magnolia Shareholding”).
Since 2003, Wells has served as Magnolia’s CEO. Previously Wells-Wilson and Palmer served
on the Magnolia board. Palmeralso served as corporate treasurer. Wells-Wilson and Palmer
received a salary, benefits, and dividends from Magnolia. Neither wasactive in the day-to-day
business operations. At somepoint, Wells began sharing managementresponsibilities with
Grace McElleney, who now serves as Magnolia’s president.
In 2008, ADCO Global, Inc. (“ADCO”) contacted Wells regarding purchasing Magnolia.
ADCOexecuted a non-bindingletter of intent to purchase the Magnolia stock for $54 to $63
million. All of the Siblings were interested in selling to ADCOat the proposedprice. Wells
sought three additional thingsin the transaction: (1) to makegifts of a substantial portion ofhis
———indireet-ownershipinMagnoliathatwouldbenefithim ~~
(2) to exclude from the sale certain real estate held by Nolia; and (3) to be paid a “managers
premium”from the sales proceeds.
To carry out his goals, Wells sought to transfer the Magnolia Shareholding to a new
entity, Magwell, leaving the real estate with Nolia. In October 2008, the Siblingsfinalized an
Operating Agreementand agreed to a transfer of the Magnolia Shareholding whereby Nolia
transferred its Magnolia stock to Magwell in exchangeforall of the Magwell membership units.
Nolia distributed the Magwell membershipunits to the partners (the Siblings and First Nolia) in
proportion to their partnership shares (the “October 2008 Transfer”). First Nolia was to serve as
Magwell’s manager. The Siblings and First Nolia executed a Consentof Partners to
Restructuring and Transfers wherein they “agree[d] to be a party to and to be boundbyall of the
terms and conditionsof the Operating Agreement of Magwell.”
Delaysinfinalizing the Operating Agreement caused the proposedsale to ADCOtofall
through. Subsequently, disputes arose between the Siblings regarding such matters as the
paymentof dividends, termination ofthe salaries of Wells-Wilson and Palmer, a request by
Wells and McElleney to increase a “control premium”to be paid to them, Wells and McElleney
increasingtheir salaries, requests for financial statements, and a demand by Wells-Wilson and
Palmerto the Magnolia board (consisting at that time of Wells and McElleney) for an
investigation into certain third party payments andthe increased salaries of Wells and
McElleney.
At a 2018 shareholder meeting for board elections, Wells-Wilson and Palmer attempted
to invoketheir right to vote their proportional share of the Magnolia Shareholding (owned
through their respective membershipinterests in Magwell) undera provision of the Magwell
Operating Agreement. Section 6.01 of the Operating Agreementstates in relevantpart:
The business and affairs of the Company [Magwell] shall be managed by
the Managers[First Nolia]. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Agreement, the Managers[First Nolia] shall have full and complete
authority, poweranddiscretion, acting in a fiduciary capacity, to manage
and control the business, affairs and properties of the Company
[Magwell], to makeall decisions regarding those matters and to perform
any andall otheracts or activities customaryor incident to the
management of the Company’s [Magwell’s] business. Notwithstanding
theforegoing, or any otherprovision ofthis Agreement, ifa Manager
[First Nolia], or any person [Wells] authorized to act on behalfofa
Manager[First Nolia], transfers stock in a corporation whichis a
“controlled corporation”within the meaning of Code Section 2036(b)(2)
to the Company [Magwell], the rightto vote with respect to such stock
shall be exercised by the Members in proportion to their Ownership
Interestsfromtime to time, andnot by the Manager[First Nolia] (except
to the extent ofthe Manager’s [First Nolia’s] Ownership Interest).
(The “§6.01 Condition;” emphasis supplied.) Wells-Wilson contends, and Palmerconcurs,that a
transferwithin meaning §6.01placvirtue October when
Wells, acting through First Nolia, transferred the Magnolia Shareholding from Nolia Enterprises
to Magwell. Thus, Wells-Wilson and Palmer contend that Magwell’s membersare entitled to
vote the Magnolia Shareholding at board elections in proportion to their ownership interest in
Magwell. Wells contends that the §6.01 Condition has not been met and that First Nolia has the
right to vote the Magwell Shareholding.
Pursuantto an arbitration provision in the Magwell Operating Agreement, the matter was
submitted to arbitration under the AAA Commercial Rules. Thearbitration provision states that:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with, or
relating to, this Agreement or anybreach oralleged breach hereofshall be
submitted to, and settled by, arbitration in the City of Atlanta, State of
Georgia, pursuant to the commercialarbitration rules then in effect of the
American Arbitration Association (or at any timeorat any otherplace or
under any other form ofdispute resolution mutually acceptable to the
parties so involved). Any award rendered shall be final and conclusive
upontheparties and a judgmentthereon maybe entered in the highest
court of the forum,state or federal, having jurisdiction. The expenses of
the arbitration, including the cost of experts, evidence and counselfees,
shall be borne bythe unsuccessful or losing party in the dispute,
controversy orclaimthatis settled by such arbitration, or shared as
determined by the arbitrator, taking into consideration therelative merits
of each party’s positions.
In herarbitration demand, Wells-Wilson sought two declarations:
(1) that “Section 6.01 of the Operating Agreement entitles the members of
Magwell to vote the shares of Magnolia stock held by Magwellin
proportion to their respective ownership interests in Magwell;” and
(2) that Wells-Wilson and Palmer“were duly elected as the only directors
of Magnolia’s board ofdirectors at the October 15, 2018 shareholder’s
meeting.”
Wells-Wilsonalso asserted a claim for breach ofcontract, breach of the covenantof good faith
and fair dealing, and for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 against Wells and First Nolia.
After conducting a hearing and taking evidence, Arbitrator Shelby Grubbs, issued the
following awards:
e Interim Award: Issued November 27, 2019,finding, inter alia, that: Wells-Wilson had
provenher case by clear and convincing evidence; the October 2008 Transfer triggered
the §6.01 Condition such that Wells-Wilsonis entitled to a declaration that“[t]he right to
vote shares in [Magnolia] owned by [Magwell] belongsto the owners of Magwell in
proportion to their ownership;” Wells-Wilsonis entitled to injunctive relief (but deferring
aruling on the form of such relief pending further briefing/evidence); Wells-Wilson is
notentitled to damages butis entitled to recover her attorney’s fees and expenses in the
arbitration from Wells (but deferring a monetary award of fees and costs pendingfurther
briefing/evidence); Wells is not entitled to indemnity; and Magwell must be reimbursed
for all funds charged to Magwell in connectionwith the arbitration.
e Amended Interim Award: Issued December 30, 2019, amendingthe declaratory relief
awarded to Wells-Wilson as “[t]he right to vote shares in [Magnolia] owned by
[Magwell] belongs to the Members of Magwell in proportion to their ownership.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
e Second Interim Award: Issued January 13, 2020, concerning injunctiverelief and,inter
alia, enjoining Wells, Magwell, and First Nolia from taking any action to interfere with
Members’right to exercise or direct the vote of their shares of Magnolia stock, requiring
them to recognize and give full effect to such Members’ voting rights, requiring Wells
and First Nolia to reimburse to Magwellall costs related to the arbitration and ordering
that such costs be distributed to Magwell’s ownersin relation to their ownership interest.
e Final Award: Issued February 12, 2020, incorporating the above interim awards and
awarding Wells-Wilson $805,644.71 in attorney’s fees and costs related to the
arbitration. !
Wells-Wilson filed her motion to confirm the arbitration award on February 12, 2020.
Wells filed his motion to vacate the award on February 25, 2020. On March6, 2020,
RespondentLinda J. Palmerfiled an answer to Wells-Wilson’s motionto confirm,stating that
she does not oppose confirmation of the award. This case was transferred to the Business Case
Division by Order entered on May1, 2020.
“The court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after
its delivery to him, unless the award is vacated or modified by the court as providedin this part.”
O.C.G.A.§ 9-9-12.? Confirmation is not discretionary. See,e.g., Brookfield Country Club, Inc.
v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 287 Ga. 408, 412 (2010) (““Georgia’s Arbitration Code demands
that a court shall confirm an award uponapplication of a party unless the award is vacated or
modified by the court as providedin this part.” (citations and punctuation omitted)); ABCO
"Noparty hastaken issue with the arbitrator’s award of attorney fees and costs to Wells-Wilson.
> No party has movedthe court to modify the award.
Builders, Inc. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc., 282 Ga. 308, 309 (2007) (“Our arbitration code was
designed to preserve and ensure the efficacy and expediencyofarbitration awards.”); Greene v.
Hundley, 266 Ga. 592, 595 (1996) (“The Arbitration Code requiresa trial court to confirm an
award uponthetimely application ofa party to the award, unless one ofthe statutory grounds for
vacating or modifying the awardis established.”); Lanier Worldwide, Inc. v. Bridgecenters At
Park Meadows, LLC, 279 Ga. App. 879, 880 (2006) (“Where no groundexists for vacating or
modifying the award,it is the duty of the court to confirm it.”).
 Anarbitration award may be vacated
if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed asa neutral;
(3) An oversteppingby the arbitrators of their authority or such
imperfect executionofit that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made;
(4) A failure to follow the procedureofthis part, unless the party
applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice
of this failure and without objection; or
(5) The arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b). O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) sets out the exclusive bases for vacating an award.
See, e.g., ABCO Builders, 282 Ga. at 309 (“judicial review ofan arbitration awardis strictly
limited to five statutory groundsset forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)”); Greene, 266 Ga. at 592,
596 (“an arbitration award may be vacatedonly if one or moreofthe [five] statutory grounds set
forth in § 9-9-13(b) is foundto exist’); see also Brookfield Country Club, 287 Ga. at 413
(holding that the GAC “doesnot permit contracting parties who provide for arbitration of
disputes to contractually expandthe scopeofjudicial review that is authorized bystatute.”).
The exclusive bases for vacating an award are exceedingly narrow. “[T]he powerto
vacate an arbitration award should beseverely limited in order notto frustrate the purpose of
avoidinglitigation by resorting to arbitration.” Greene, 266 Ga. at 595; accord Malice v.
Coloplast Corp., 278 Ga. App. 395, 397 (2006) (“It is well established under both federal and
Georgia law that ‘judicial review ofan arbitration award is among the narrowest knownto the
law.’”); Scana Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Cobb Energy Management Corp., 259 Ga. App. 216,
221 (2002) (“The Arbitration Code demandsthat courts give extraordinary deference to the
arbitration process and awardsso thatthe trial court cannotalter the award.”).
“Whenpresented with a petition to confirm anarbitration award,a trial court maynot
inquire into the merits of the dispute or consider the sufficiency of the evidence. A confirmation
proceeding doesnotcreate a forum forrelitigating arbitrated issues.” ABCO Builders, 282 Ga. at
309 (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Domanv. Stapleton, 272 Ga. App. 114, 117
(2005) (“The authority of courts to review an award, pursuant to a motionto vacate, is very
limited; courts cannot inquire into the merits of an arbitrable controversy; arbitrators are free to
award onthe basis of broad principles of fairness and equity; and an arbitrator need not make
findingsorstate the reasons in support of the award.”); Scana Energy, 259 Ga. App.at 219 (“an
arbitration award cannotbeset aside for mistakes of fact made bythearbitrators”).
Theprohibition against consideringthe sufficiency of the evidence as
grounds for vacating an arbitration award is unconditional. Therefore, a
reviewing court is prohibited from weighing the evidence submitted
before the arbitrator, regardless of whetherthe court believes there to be
sufficient evidence, or even any evidence, to support the award.... [The
legislature] did not makearbitration a part of the judicial process, nor did
it make arbitration subject to traditional rules of appellate review. To the
contrary, arbitration is a unique procedure thatexists in Georgia due to
legislative fiat, and it is conducted in accordance with the rules established
by the legislature.
Greene, 266 Ga. at 596-97; accord Doman, 272 Ga. App. at 117.
Moreover, “[t]he fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by
a court of law or equity is not groundforvacating or refusing to confirm the award.” O.C.G.A. §
9-9-13(d).
Respondents movethe court to vacate each of the four awards issued bythearbitrator on
a plethora of grounds,includingthat the arbitrator exhibited partiality in his rulings, overstepped
his authority as provided by the parties’ agreement, failed to follow the GAC, and manifestly
disregarded the law. The party seeking vacation ofanarbitration award bears the burden of
demonstrating sufficient groundsto vacate the award. See, e.g., Humar Props., LLLP v. Prior
Tire Enterprises, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 306, 308 (2004).
“[T]he question of whetheror not to disqualify an arbitrator on groundsofpartiality
addressesitself to the sound discretionofthetrial court.” Torres v. Piedmont Builders, Inc., 300
Ga. App. 872, 873 (2009). “Asto the degree ofpartiality required in orderto vitiate [an] award,
it has been held sufficient that the relationship betweenthearbitrators and oneofthe parties is of
sucha nature as to give clear grounds for suspicion oftheir proceedings and renderit unlikely
that they constituted the fair and impartial tribunal to which the otherparty is entitled.” Jd. at
3 Additionally, Respondents assert — erroneously — that there is a non-statutory basis for
overturning the awards, because they were “arbitrary and capricious.” The Georgia Supreme
Court, however, has declared that the statutory bases are the only ones upon whicha trial court
can overturn an award rendered pursuant to the GAC. See ABCO Builders, 282 Ga. at 309; see
also King v. King, 354 Ga. App. 19, 23 (2020) (“Thesefive statutory basesare the exclusive
groundsfor vacating an arbitration award.”); Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co., LLC, 295 Ga. App.
720, 722 n.9 (2009)(rejecting arbitrary and capricious conduct as a basis for vacating an award
under the GAC).
874; accord Phan v. Andre & Blaustein, LLP, 309 Ga. App. 191, 193 (2011). “Merely pointing
to adverse factual and legal findings cannotsustain an allegation of bias within the meaning of
subsection (b)(2).” Faiyaz v. Dicus, 245 Ga. App. 55, 58-59 (2000). Upon a thoroughreview of
the record,including the interim andfinal arbitration awards, and for the reasons addressed by
the court at the hearing on this matter, the court finds no support for Respondents’ contention
that their rights were prejudicedby anypartiality of the arbitrator.
Respondentscontendthat the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law,particularly in his
_~~_-~constructionofSection6.01 of the Operating Agreement. To show that the arbitrator manifestly
disregardedthe law the burdenis quite high. As explained by the Georgia Supreme Court:
 
This ground provides thatan arbitrator’s award maybevacatedifit can be
shown that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the proper law applicable
to the case before him. This disregard must be both evident and
intentional. An arbitration board that incorrectly interprets the law has not
manifestly disregardedit. It has simply made a legal mistake. To
manifestly disregard the law, one mustbe consciousofthe law and
deliberately ignore it.... Therefore, to prove that a manifest disregard of
the law hasoccurred, a party wishing to havean arbitration award vacated
must provide evidence of record that, not only wasthe correct law
communicated to an arbitrator, but that the arbitrator intentionally and
knowingly choseto ignorethat law despite the fact that it was correct.
ABCOBuilders, 282 Ga. at 309 (citations and punctuation omitted).
[M]anifest disregard of the law, a conceptoriginating in federal common
law, hasneverbeen the equivalentof insufficiency of the evidence or a
misapplication of the law to the facts. It is a much narrowerstandard...
[Mlanifest disregard of the law requires (1) that the governing law alleged
to have beendisregarded is well defined, explicit and clearly applicable
and (2) proofthat the arbitrator was aware ofthe law but decidedto ignore
it. Thus, an error in interpreting the applicable law doesnotconstitute
“manifest disregard.’ The applicable law must have been deliberately
ignored.
Johnson RealEstate Invs., LLC v. Aqua Indus., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 638, 640 (2006)(citations and
punctuation omitted); accord Gainesville Mechanical, Inc. v. Air Data, Inc., 350 Ga. App. 614,
616-17 (2019) (“this showing is an extremely difficult one to make”); Savannah Dodge,Inc.v.
Bynes, 291 Ga. App. 281, 282 (2008).
To vacate an award uponthis ground, there mustbe clear, concrete evidence ofthe
arbitrator’s specific intent to purposefully disregard the law.
[C]lear evidenceofthe arbitrator’s intent to purposefully disregard the law
is required. That is, there must be concrete evidenceofthis intent either in
the findings ofthe arbitrator, if he or she chooses to make such findings,
or in thetranscript ofthe arbitration hearing, if the parties choose to have
the hearing transcribed.
ABCOBuilders, 282 Ga. at 309; accord Savannah Dodge, 291 Ga. App.at 282-83.
“Accordingly, merely objecting to the results of an arbitration is not sufficient underthis
ground.... Nor can arbitrators be reversed forerrors or misinterpretations of the law.” Ralston v.
City ofDahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 390-91 (1999).
 
 While-anarbitrator cannot ignore the plain languageof a contract, courts must not
decide the rightness or wrongnessofthe arbitrators’ contract interpretation, only whethertheir
decision ‘drawsits essence’ fromthe contract.” America’s Home Place, Inc. v. Cassidy, 301 Ga.
App. 233, 236 (2009) (citations omitted). Here, the record demonstrates that the arbitrator was
cognizantof applicable contract construction law and construed the Operating Agreementin
conformity therewith. “It is not the function of this court to second-guessthe arbitrator’s
interpretation of the contract.” Johnson Real Estate Invs., 282 Ga. App.at 641. Forthe further
reasons addressed by the court at the hearing on this matter, the court finds no support for
Respondents’ contentionthattheir rights were prejudiced by any manifest disregard of the law
by the arbitrator with respectto the contract issues presented and decided at the arbitration.
Respondents contendthe arbitrator overstepped his authority by failing to properly apply
Georgia contract construction law and by awarding indemnification and reimbursementoffees.
“Overstepping’ like the other grounds for vacating arbitration awardsis
very limited in scope. ‘Overstepping’ has been described as ‘addressing
issues not properly before the arbitrator.’... Thus, this ground does not
apply wherean issue is properly raised beforethe arbitrator. Progressive
Data Systemsv. Jefferson Randolph Corp., 275 Ga. 420, 421 (568 S.E.2d
474) (2002).
Hendersony. Millner Devs., 259 Ga. App. 709, 711 (2003); accord Berger v. Welsh, 326 Ga.
App. 290, 292 (2014); Johnson Real Estate Investments, 282 Ga. App. at 642. “The limits of an
arbitrator’s authority are defined bythe parties’ arbitration agreement.” Henderson, 259 Ga.
App.at 711.
And, wherethe scopeofthe arbitration agreementis broad, and wherethe parties agreed
to arbitrateall of their disputes and claims, there can be nofindingthat the arbitrator overstepped
his or her authority. See, e.g., Greene, 266 Ga. at 596 (whereboth parties agreedthatarbitrator
would resolveall existing disputes between them,arbitrator did not overstep his authority);
Henderson, 259 Ga. App. at 711 (no overstepping where agreementbroadly gave arbitrator
authority to resolve any claim arising outofthe parties’ contract); Ralston, 236 Ga. App.at 388.
Here, the scopeoftheparties’ arbitration provisionis quite broad, reaching “[a]ny dispute,
controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with, or relating to, this Agreementor any
breach or alleged breachhereof.”
Rule 47 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, under whichtheparties agreed to
arbitrate their claims, provides as follows:
(a) The arbitrator may grant any remedyorrelief that the arbitrator deems
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreementofthe parties,
including, but not limited to, specific performanceofa contract.
(b) In additionto a final award, the arbitrator may make otherdecisions,
including interim, interlocutory,or partial rulings, orders, and awards. In
any interim, interlocutory, or partial award, the arbitrator may assess and
 ~~apportiontheexpenses,compensationrelatedtosuch award as
the arbitrator determines is appropriate.
(c) In the final award,the arbitrator shall assess the fees, expenses, and
compensation provided in Sections R-53, R-54, and R-55. Thearbitrator
mayapportion such fees, expenses, and compensation amongtheparties in
such amounts as the arbitrator determinesis appropriate.
(d) The awardofthearbitrator(s) may include:
(i) interest at such rate and from such date asthe arbitrator(s) may
deem appropriate; and
(ii) an award ofattorneys’ feesif all parties have requested such an
awardorit is authorized by law ortheir arbitration agreement.
Upona full review of the record, the court finds that the arbitrator did not overstep his
authority in deciding the contract issues presented bytheparties.
Lastly, Respondents take issue with certain injunctive relief awarded bythe arbitrator. In
the Second Interim Award,the arbitrator rendered the following awards, which were
incorporated into the Final Award:
3. Respondents, D. Richard Wells and First Nolia Enterprises, Inc., jointly
and severally, including their agents and officers and any successor agents
and officers are permanently enjoined to cause the reimbursement from
First Nolia and D. Richard Wells to Magwellofall costs, advances,fees,
or expensesrelated to this arbitration that were incurred by anyofthe
Magwell Respondents and have been charged to or paid by Magwell.
4, Respondent Magwell, LLC, includingits agents, officers and Managers
and any successoragents, officers and Managers, is permanently enjoined
to cause all amounts reimbursed to Magwell under the preceding
paragraphto be distributed to Magwell LLC’s ownersin proportion to
their respective ownership interests in Magwell.
5. Respondents, D. Richard Wells, Magwell, LLC and First Nolia
Enterprises,Inc., jointly and severally, includingtheir agents, officers and
Managers and any successor agents, officers and Managers,are
permanently enjoined from charging any costs, advances, fees, or
expensesrelated to this Arbitration and incurred by Respondents, D.
Richard Wells, Magwell, LLC and First Nolia Enterprises, Inc. (or any of
them) to Magwell. If any ofthese costs, advances, fees, or expenses are
nevertheless charged to or paid by Magwell, LLC,they are to be promptly
reimbursed and distributed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
 6. Without the authorization of a court exercising jurisdiction,
Respondents D. Richard Wells and Magwell, LLC andFirst Nolia
Enterprises, Inc., jointly and severally, including their agents, officers and
Managers and any successoragents, officers and Managers, are
permanently enjoined from charging to Magwell, LLC anycosts,
advances, fees, or expensesrelated to any proceedingspertainingto this
Arbitration (including any proceedings to confirm, modify, or vacate any
awards issued in this arbitration) and incurred by Respondents, D. Richard
Wells, Magwell, LLC and First Nolia Enterprises, Inc. (or any of them). If
any of these costs, advances, fees, or expenses are nevertheless charged to
or paid by Magwell without the authorization of a court exercising
jurisdiction, they are to be promptly reimbursed anddistributed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
Asspecified at the hearing,the court finds that the Final Award must be vacated insofar
as it effectively enjoins Magwell from retaining and paying legal counsel to representit in this
matter and fails to identify the amountof fees and expensesincurred on behalf of each ofthe
Respondents. Under the GAC,“[a] party has the right to be represented by an attorney and may
claim suchright at any time as to any part ofthe arbitration or hearings which have not taken
place. This right may not be waived.” O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8(c); see also Ga. Const., Art. 1, § 1, 9 12
(“No personshall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend,either in person or by an
attorney, that person’s own causein anyofthe courts ofthis state.”). Consequently, the court
finds that the arbitrator failed to follow the procedure of the GAC and that Magwell did not have
notice of this failure and continue without objection. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(4).
Additionally, the findings madeby the arbitrator as to Respondents’ fees and expenses do not
include amounts suchthat the court would be able to confirm the award and enter judgment. See
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(3) (award shall be vacated where “a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made”).
Respondents argue that the arbitrator additionally failed to follow GAC procedure and
AAA tules with respect to such issuesas the timing of the arbitrator’s closing of the hearing, his
issuanceof interim awards, andhis taking additional evidence. For the reasons addressed by the
court at the hearing onthis matter, the court finds no support for Respondents’ contention that
their rights were prejudiced by failure on the part of the arbitrator to follow proper procedure.
See, e.g., Barge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 245 Ga. App. 112, 115-16 (2000) (“Given
the parties’ designation of the AAA asthe supervisory authority regardingthe resolution of
disputes under the agreement, the AAA’s view of the meaningofits rules is of considerable
10
significance.” (citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Green Tree Servicing, LLC v.
Jones, 333 Ga. App. 184, 185 (2015).
Becausethe court cannot vacate anarbitration award in part, the court is hereby vacating
the entirety of the Final Award based onthe specific issues identified by the court. See, e.g.,
SCSJ Enters. v. Hansen & Hansen Enters., 306 Ga. App. 188, 189 (2010)(the “law of this State
requiresthat, if a trial court vacates an arbitration award, it may doso only inits entirety”).
However,thecourtshallspecifywhatissuesarbitrator is consideremand.See,
e.g., id. at 190 (“the GAC expressly provides that a rehearing may be limited to the specific issue
necessitating the vacatur”). The “vacatur of the entire arbitration award will not renderthe prior
proceedingsa nullity.” Jd. “Upon vacating an award, the court mayorder a rehearing and
determinationofall or any of the issues either before the samearbitrators or before new
arbitrators appointed as provided by this part.” O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(e).
Therefore, the court hereby ORDERSasfollows: the Final Award is VACATEDinits
entirety. This matter shall be reheard by arbitrator Shelby Grubbsorsucharbitrator as the AAA
Commercial Rules provide. The issues to be reheard and decided are as follows:
1. A determination ofall amounts (costs, advances, fees, or expensesrelated to the
arbitration and any proceedingspertaining to the arbitration) paid or incurred by Magwell
on its own behalf.
2. A determination ofall amounts (costs, advances, fees, or expensesrelated to the
arbitration and any proceedingspertaining to the arbitration) to be reimbursed to Magwell
from First Nolia and Wells and distributed to Magwell’s members.
3. That portion of the award enjoining Magwell from incurring furtherfees and expenses in
this matter, in a manner consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED,this 27" day of July, 2020.
/s/ Wesley B. Tailor
Wesley B. Tailor, Judge
State Court of Fulton County
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